What exists "out there"? What does "doing physics" mean? What are the axiomatic ideas for microphysics? What is a particle? What is an apparatus made of? We show that Quantum Mechanics textbooks cannot truly answer this kind of question whereas they should. By adopting a pure "hitological" point of view for microphysics, we introduce the Hit in Apparatuses Theory (HAT) and the Vacuum of Apparatuses (VA) that restore, through Object Orientation (OO), an intuitive ontology to deal with this kind of physics. Through a review of what it means to "observe" and what relativism means in Special and General Relativities (SR and GR), we address the problem of finding common maths for GR and QM. Finally, with our new HAT, we address the measurement problem in QM and propose two possible approaches.
What is "doing physics"?
Physics is made of three components: ideas about nature, mathematics, experiments. A good theory should have all three. First of all, clear ideas about something in nature, something "out there". Second, a clear mapping of these ideas with mathematical symbols. Third, a good matching of experimental results or observations (the data) with what is derived from the maths. We have the deep conviction that if we do not have all three, especially the right ideas, we are not doing good physics or even physics at all! This could be represented with the semantic equation
doing-physics = (ideas, maths, experiments)
Maths is the logical manipulation of propositions made with symbols. One set of propositions, the axioms, is more fundamental than the others. The axioms are considered de facto as true and are, by construction and definition, out of the process of demonstration because demonstrations and theorems rely on the axioms. Regarding the ideas for physics it appears that we have a similar kind of process. Among all ideas some seem to be more fundamental than others, for example the ideas of space and time. We are going to qualify such ideas as "axiomatic". It is interesting to question what the axiomatic ideas are in today's physics. For example, we are going to see that the idea of "corpuscle", defined as a little object "out there" bearing properties of its own and "flying around", is far from being such an obvious axiomatic idea as it looks.
It is interesting to note that this kind of reductive process seems to apply in experimental physics too. Some experiments, such as the "two slits" one, reveal so sharply a peculiar feature of nature that they look axiomatic too! 2 The Hilbert Formalism (HF)
The Schrödinger equation
Before the mid 1920s we had very good theories dealing with meso and macro scales "out there": classical mechanics, Maxwell theory, General Relativity. In particular in these theories ideas did not pose problems. They were the ideas of solid body, space, time, field. These ideas were nicely symbolized by using differential calculus. Moreover, we had an impressive match with experiments. However, things collapsed around 1925 with microscale physics. One key experimental fact was the observation of the spectrum of emitted light from an illuminated hydrogen gas that appeared to be. . . discrete! A key theoretical fact was the discovery by Schrödinger of an equation able to recover this spectrum
This equation (the "time independent" one) operates on a field ψ, has the symbol E representing Energy as a parameter and a "potential field" V as a constraint. A wonderful feature of this equation is that for some particular potentials it has solutions for ψ only if E is in a discrete spectrum, and it appears that in the case of a 1/r potential, this spectrum matches the observed one of the illuminated hydrogen gas. This is brillant (no pun intended). Especially knowing that the Maxwell theory, based on the idea of corpuscles flying around in a field mapped on space-time, was not able to recover the observed spectrum. The calculations can be found in many books. The author encountered them for the first time in [1] .
This magic equation seems to solve the question of microphysics, but a "little detail" prevents that: we have no clear idea to attach to. . . ψ!
Definition of the HF
The Schrödinger equation leads to new maths that we are going to name here the Hilbert Formalism (HF in short). It is the maths used in today's microphysics. The HF is based on Hilbert vector space using complex numbers, equipped with an inner product to get real numbers from vectors, operators acting on a vector, a whole corpus of logic to analyse the spectrum of operators, a way to decompose a vector (a ψ) into the basis of an operator, etc. . . In this text we are not going to question this formalism but more to question the ideas of the physics attached to it and, for example, the idea attached to the ψ of the Schrödinger equation which is itself part of the HF.
So what is the idea for ψ? Probability of what?
What is ψ for? A textbook answer is that ψ is used to calculate probabilities. Fine, but the probability of what? It would be natural to say that the axiomatic ideas for microphysics are space, time and corpuscles able to "fly around" and that ψ is used to calculate the probability that a corpuscle "be" in a given position, with the randomness having its origin in some unknown effect to be discovered or, why not, being an axiomatic idea of randomness.
In general, experts, teachers and textbooks discard this view, this interpretation, by saying that ψ is used to calculate the probability that the corpuscle "be found" at a given position. This is a subtle difference, but an essential one. In particular this "be found" assumes de facto an apparatus logic in the foundations, in the axiomatic ideas. This "be found", and the fundamental change of semantic attached to it, has its origin in a piece of maths in the HF called the "Heisenberg inequality" and an interpretation of this inequality called the "Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle" (HUP). We are definitely not going to argue about this "principle" here (perhaps in another text when equipped with our new HAT), but a key feature of the HUP is to say that we can no longer attach both the properties of position and speed (momentum in fact) to a corpuscle. With the consequence that the idea of trajectory no longer makes sense in microphysics, and so the idea of "flying around out there" makes no sense either.
In order to keep the connection to nature, textbooks fall back on an "axiomatic measurement logic" by attaching position or momentum to the result of a measurement process on a "tiny something" that we are going to name "particle" from now on rather than "corpuscle". We reserve the term "corpuscle" to a "tiny object" having a trajectory as in classical mechanics or Maxwell theory. We may write the definitions corpuscle def = tiny object with trajectory particle def = tiny object without trajectory A key point is that a "particle be found" assumes anyway that there are "tiny objects out there" beside the axiomatic apparatus needed to attach ψ to the idea of "be found".
It is here that we start to have problem of interpretation because if ψ is dedicated to a "be found", there remains nothing in the formalism to symbolise a "tiny something"! In particular, since there are no more trajectories, there are no X, Y, Z(t) symbols to represent a "tiny object out there". So with these ideas attached to the Hilbert Formalism, we are driven to a strange interpretation in which some axiomatic ideas ("tiny object" or "particle") have no direct mapping symbols in the formalism. Weird.
Moreover, the symbols of space and time, t and → x, appear both in ψ(t, → x) and in the partial derivaties of the Schrödinger equation. A three dimensional uniform and constant metric is also hidden in the Laplacian ∆ of the equation (through a δ ij ). So we must conclude that a "found position" has to be understood from an apparatus immersed in a Euclidean space-time. This induces a more acute problem of interpretation since we have to speak of a "tiny object out there" not represented in the formalism, having no trajectory of its own, and that cannot be said to be "here", but is nevertheless in a "here" when measured because of the Euclidean "here" defined by the apparatus! Highly weird.
To labour the point we could mention the "spin". If we put an illuminated hydrogen gas in a magnet we observe a change in the emitted spectrum. It appears that the HF has the spinor operator piece of maths that brings the necessary degrees of freedom to model the modified spectrum. So we have a good match of the maths with an experimental result -fine! However, things go wrong when looking at the ideas presented in textbooks to justify the usage of the spinor maths. Spinor is a mathematical object related to rotation in a Euclidean three dimensional space and textbooks attach a "spin" property to their "particle" (spin 1/2 of the electron). How can we attach to the "tiny object" a property related to rotation in the Euclidean space of the apparatus which is the only space at hand in this interpretation? How can we attach the idea of meso scale rotation to something that cannot be said to be "here"? How can we attach a geometric idea to a "tiny object" that cannot be said to "be" in space? Most textbooks evade the issue by saying that spin is a "pure Quantum Mechanics effect" which obviously explains. . . nothing! Worse, before reaching this conclusion some dare to use the analogy of the classical spinning top in order to give an "intuitive feeling" to what the "spin" of a "particle" is. A disaster! (A classical spinning top is an object having a spatial structure that rotates "out there").
If there is no XY Z(t) in the formalism, and no more symbols to represent the "particle" directly, it would be much more consistent to say that there are no particles at all and then say that ψ is used to calculate the probability that a cell at a given position in a measuring apparutus has to fire. This is much more convincing since the HF has symbols to describe a measuring device (the operators) and also has symbols to describe a "source apparatus" (the vectors). "Source" here is interpreted as the source of the firing events in the sense that, if the source apparatus is not there, then we never observe the firing of cells.
It is this "no particle" idea that we would like to develop in this text to see if we can have a more consistent approach to microphysics. More consistent at the level of the maths and experiments, but also of the ideas.
What is Quantum Mechanics?
A textbook about microphysics that uses the HF is said to be about "Quantum Mechanics" (QM in short) [1] , [2] , [3] . As just discussed, a particle vocabulary is still heavily used in these QM books. The words atom, electron, particle, etc. . . often appear in the introduction as if taken for granted, without any kind of definition. To help the argumentation of this text, we are going to rely on this usage of a particle vocabulary to define "Quantum Mechanics". In fact few books come with a definition of what QM is. For us, QM is the area of science dealing with microphysics based on the maths of the HF but still associated with a particle vocabulary.
Having the conviction that this undue vocabulary is the source of the intuitive discomfort that many people have with "QM" (including the author), we are going to see if it is possible to reread the HF by avoiding this vocabulary and then restore a clear understanding of the science of microphysics.
HAT: Hit in Apparatuses Theory

HAT, detector and hit-source definitions
HAT, for Hit in Apparatuses Theory, is defined as an interpretation of the HF formalism based solely on the two axiomatic ideas of apparatuses and hits appearing in them.
Experimental microphysics shows that we can classify apparatuses in two categories, the "detectors" and the "hit-sources". We define a "detector" as an apparatus in which hits appear. For the moment the hits are zero dimensional (punctual) events appearing in the detectors. Some apparatuses are such that, if they are not present, no hits appear in a detector apparatus. We define a hit-source apparatus as such an apparatus. In a complex detector (some made of many devices) hits often appear in a pattern that characterizes the hit-source (for example an "electromagnetic shower" hit pattern).
It is important, in fact fundamental, to note that the definitions above do not use the words corpuscle and particle at all. We consider that these definitions are good foundations because they do not pose a problem of realism for us. At first glance, HAT looks like some kind of "hitology", but we are going to see that it is more than that.
A no-go for corpuscles in microphysics?
To define apparatuses we could have said that they are made of an aggregate of corpuscles (as defined in the first paragraph), that a hit-source is a device that emits corpuscles and that a detector is a device that reacts by producing a hit when impacted by a corpuscle. "Corpuscle" would then have been a universal axiomatic idea. It is very natural to attempt to define apparatuses and the whole of microphysics in this way, but it appears that one part of this kind of theory. . . does not work! A nice reasoning of John Bell, tested in "Bohm-Aspect" kind of experiments, is said to rule out the idea that a hit is produced by a corpuscle emitted from the source. For clarity of the overall argumentation, we must explain, with our words, the outline of a Bohm-Aspect type experiment and the Bell reasoning.
Bohm-Aspect setup
We can imagine an experimental setup composed of three apparatuses, a hit-source and two detectors placed remotely aside the hit-source by having the three devices aligned along the same axis (named z here). Each detector is such that it defines an oriented axis in a plan perpendicular to z so that "+hit" can appear in the forward direction of this axis and "-hit" can appear in the backward direction of the axis. and then calculate the "correlation factor" C as
One macroscopic parameter of the setup we can play with, is the relative angle θ of the axes of the two detectors. Other macroscopic parameters are the two distances of each detector to the hit-source, but strangely they do not appear in the reasoning. We can then do various acquisitions (runs) by getting C for various θ and draw an experimental curve C exp (θ). As the shape of this curve is not relevant for the argumentation, we are not going to show it here. It helps to concentrate on the essentials.
It is important, in fact fundamental, to note that in the description of the experiment we have not used the words corpuscle, particle and in particular "pair of photons".
Bell reasoning
It is at this point that Bell's reasoning comes into play. Bell claims that a large set of theories describing the experiment, and in particular the ones based on corpuscles, must match some conditions, the Bell conditions (BC in short), and that when these conditions are met, then the C theory under BC (θ) has some constraints. The passage from the Bell conditions to the constraints over C(θ) is the Bell theorem. A striking result is that these constraints are such that a C theory under BC (θ), and then C corpuscle theory (θ), cannot reproduce the C exp (θ)! In Bohm-Aspect-Bell (BAB in short), it is not the fact that there are coincident hits that poses a problem, but the fact that the amount of correlation for some θ cannot be explained by some theories, and in particular by the most intuitive theory that we can imagine at first, the one describing nature with corpuscles flying around and interacting locally with the detectors. Said simply, for some θs there is too much correlation for an intuitive corpuscle theory. With the BAB logic, it seems that we have a proof that this kind of theory cannot work and therefore that our intuition is baffled by experimental microphysics! After the pioneer texts [4] , [5] , [6] , a lot was written to criticize. . . everything! In general criticisms are of two kinds. First, criticisms around how the experiments are done. Second, criticisms around the fact that the Bell conditions cannot put aside all the corpuscle based theories. In this text we are going to assume that "BAB is granted" 1 , and in particular that the experimental data and the C exp (θ) curve are granted.
The HF at work and the HAT point of view
This loss of the idea of corpuscle looks like the end of "doing microphysics", but the situation is partially rescued because. . . it is possible to model this experiment with the Hilbert Formalism! If the hit-source is modeled by a vector of the HF and the detectors are modeled by operators of the HF, the formalism makes it possible to calculate a C HF (θ) that matches the C exp (θ)! Since the setup was presented by using a pure HAT terminology, and we have defined HAT has being associated to the HF, then we can write
and so we have restored clear ideas mapped to neat maths that recovers the data : "doing microphysics" is back for this experiment! Moreover, it is back in a way that reinforces a pure HAT point of view since the Bell reasoning is said to eliminate, in this case, the word "corpuscle".
The QM point of view
As QM is also attached to the HF, we have
but what is striking is that in general the experimental setup is presented by using the words "pair of photons" to qualify the "source". As QM defenders also accept the "loss of corpuscles" coming from the Bell reasoning, we are driven into a strange microphysics in which on the one hand the "good old corpuscles" are said to be ruled out, but on the other hand the word "photon" is nevertheless used to describe the setup! Weird. . . again! To qualify this strange "pair of photons source" that can produce, for some θ, an amount of correlation not reproducible by a corpuscle theory, the word "entanglement" was introduced (the source is often presented as a source of "pairs of entangled photons"). This new word obviously clarifies nothing, since we have no clear idea of the nature of the entity being qualified! For us, the questioning around this kind of experiment is not to qualify a source of "photons", but to know if it still makes sense to use the word "photon" at all! QM defenders should first speak about an experimental setup with a "hit-source" being able to produce particular coincident hits, and then ask the question: does a photon entity make sense to explain them?
It is worth noting that the HAT point of view transforms an uncomfortable feeling of weirdness coming from QM, to a healthy feeling of awe. The awe at finding in nature hit-sources able to produce such C exp (θ) not explainable by a corpuscle theory!
A remark
It is also interesting to note that the BAB argumentation does not destroy the idea of apparatuses being, or not being, an aggregate of corpuscles! Strictly speaking BAB does not address this problem, it destroys the idea of corpuscles only for the "in between" apparatuses. Consequently, we start to realize that the nature of apparatuses is going to be a central question. This point is going to be explored later.
We are Object Oriented!
For us, being unable to decide on which foot to dance with the word "particle" in QM is what induces the huge discomfort that we have with this interpretation of the HF for microphysics. The discomfort arises because the idea of property-bearing objects is something deeply rooted in the way we think: we, as human beings, are. . . object oriented! We are "OO", and a theory about nature unable to pinpoint its own objects cannot be a good theory for us. We claim that HAT is better than QM, because HAT clears the decks concerning the word "particle".
And what if nature were not OO? If that were the case, we would be unable to find the right ideas for the "out there", which would mean a true end to "doing physics" as defined above, but it seems that we still have some cards to play, so let us continue. . .
The two slits experiment
The "two slits" is a canonical experiment used in QM textbooks to justify the HF. This justification comes from the fact that the HF contains a vector addition which represents very well what is observed. In general the two-slits is also presented as the canonical experiment showing that "microphysics is weird", and this because there is no way to answer the canonical question "through which slit does the particle pass?". As we are going to see, a HAT point view naturally removes any kind of weirdness here.
As for the Bohm-Aspect setup, it is important, in fact fundamental, to be careful about the words used to present the experiment. The setup is made of a hit-source apparatus pointing in a direction z, a farther cache perpendicular to z with two parallel slits (A and B) and a farther plane detector also perpendicular to z. The four experimental situations 1. slit A opened, B closed 2. slit A closed, B opened 3. slit A opened, B opened 4. slit A closed, B closed could be modeled with a σ=1,2,3,4 macroscopic parameter. In the reasoning, this parameter is an equivalent of the θ macroscopic parameter of the Bohm-Aspect setup. For the first three cases, according to σ (and then for different runs labeled by σ), we observe three distributions of hits:
). An interesting fact is that in the case σ=3, the distribution of hits has an "interference" pattern, whilst each distribution σ=1,2 does not (both are circular). So we have
What is nice is that we can model these three situations quite easily with the HF by associating a ψ for each σ. A mathematical curiosity is that, apart from a normalization factor, we have
and that ψ(σ = 3) recovers the interference pattern. So far so good, and we could have stopped the presentation of the two-slits here since the three ingredients of "doing physics" are here. Clear ideas (apparatuses, hits), good maths (the ψs and the capability to add them) and a very good matching with experiment (in particular the recovery of an interference pattern).
An important and fundamental fact is that until now we have not used the word "particle", nor the word "corpuscle", and that so far the above two-slits presentation is clear. Now if attempting to model this experiment with a corpuscle theory, we fall on a serious problem because a "standalone corpuscle flying around" theory would lead to
which is not what is observed. In particular, a corpuscle theory would not lead to an interference pattern. So, as in BAB, we are driven to the conclusion that the idea of corpuscles is ruled out in this microphysics experiment. In fact, we could have used the two-slits as a corpuscle no-go argumentation instead of BAB, but BAB is more interesting since it eliminates more theories. It should be noted that it is not so much the fact that there is an interference pattern in σ=3 which is important as the mere fact that D exp (σ = 3) is not the same as D exp (σ = 1) + D exp (σ = 2). This non equality alone is sufficient to conclude.
In QM textbooks or lectures, it is highly instructive to study the section on how the two-slits experiment is presented. Most of the time, it is presented in the first lecture by using the words "particle" or "electron" as if taken for granted. The "source" apparatus is presented de facto as a source. . . of particles, themselves often presented as corpuscles (sometime even drawn on the blackboard !). This is wrong, and because of this usage of the wrong vocabulary so early, the poor student cannot avoid catching an intuitive discomfort right from the first lecture, a discomfort that leads in general to strong nausea by the end of the term! The two-slits is presented so early more to sell the HF than anything else, in particular the linearity of the algebra, the fact that ψ(σ = 1) + ψ(σ = 2) has a physical meaning 2 . But the point with the two-slits experiment is not in the maths! It is in the fact that this experiment is a canonical one to question the usage of the words "particle" and "corpuscle" in microphysics.
We also see that a pure HAT, a pure hitological point of view, clarifies the question "through which slit does the particle pass?". HAT leads immediatly to the conclusion that this question is not answerable because it is. . . ill defined! It is ill defined because the word "particle" is ill defined in this context. The HAT point of view also transforms the sentence "microphysics is weird" to "microphysics is awesome". It is awesome because we can find in nature, "out there", hit-sources able to produce an interference hit pattern and we can model the experiment by using a nice linear algebra. Truly marvellous! The HAT point of view makes it possible to raise an interesting question: what about the case "A closed and B closed" (σ=4)? Our hitological point of view does not rule out the possibility of actually observing hits in the detector! Before saying that this is impossible, we must remember. . . the tunnel effect.
MachZender (and delayed choice) experiments
We could also have mentioned the MachZender "two arms interferometer" kind of experiment that would have drawn the same conclusions as for the Bohm-Aspect and two-slits ones. The macroscopic parameter to play with would have been the difference of length (δ) between the two arms. In such an experiment, various runs according to this macroscopic parameter would have induced some D exp (δ) experimental curve not reproducible with a theory of corpuscles flying around, but reproducible with the HF.
Here too, we would have concluded that the question "through which arm did the photon pass?" is ill defined and then unanswerable because the word "photon" is improper in this context.
A QM point of view would have shown the same defects as for the two-slits : a too early and undue usage of the word "photon" and a focalization on the maths. The conclusion would had been the same : the point is missed.
Corpuscles? at what cost?
It must be mentioned that some models exist which attempt to model the two-slits or the Bohm-Aspect results by keeping corpuscles. The Bohm model is one of them (there are X, Y, Z(t) with Bohm). Nevertheless all of them, at some point, have to introduce some weird ideas such as action at distance. Such ideas are definitely counter-intuitive and at some point not really OO. For example, action at distance induces that a corpuscle does not really bear properties in a standalone way since its behavior depends also on "the rest" (it is the "Wholeness" idea of Bohm-Hiley [4] ).
A pure "hitology"? No
Does the HAT interpretation, because it is an interpretation, induce that microphysics is reduced to a pure hitology? That is to say that nature is made of hit-source and detector apparatuses, all modeled with the Hilbert formalism for which the only goal is to calculate probability distributions of hits? In fact no, one particular set of experiments, the "decay" ones, induces that we have to consider that there is an extra entity in the whole story, the "in between" apparatuses, which appears to be an active physical entity.
To describe a "decay experiment", we first have to label a hit-source. It appears that in nature apparatuses exist, or can be built, that produce different kinds of hit pattern when the detector is placed very close to the hit-source or even without any space between the two. These different patterns make it possible to classify the hit-sources: electronhit-source, photon-hit-source, muon-hit-source, etc. . . Note that here the words electron, photon, muon are introduced with a definition (through a physical procedure). Few books in microphysics do that. We are going to name this definition, which is based on experimental facts produced with a particular apparatus setup, a "definition setup". We insist that these words are not, definitely not, introduced by describing some corpuscle entity "out there". It is interesting to note that to define the words electron, photon, muon, etc. . . it was necessary to introduce pairs of apparatuses, pairs of (hit-source, detector). A hit-source or a detector apparatus alone cannot do the job. This will be discussed again later.
Armed with this definition and classification of hit-sources, we can observe that it is possible to find (or build) in nature the following setup. A hit-source can produce a first kind of hit pattern in its associated detector placed close to it, but can produce a different kind of pattern when the detector 3 is placed farther from it! Moreover, the pattern is not only changed by some geometrical factor (for example a different size of "electromagnetic shower" hit pattern) but can also be transmuted to a hit pattern which is associated to another kind of hit-source! A typical case is with a muon-hit-source and an electron-hitsource. If a detector is placed close to a muon-hit-source, we observe a muon-hit pattern but if the detector is placed some meters farther away we no longer observe a muon-hit pattern but an electron-hit pattern! So what? A textbook explanation for this transmutation is to say that a corpuscle (for example a muon) is flying around and that it transforms itself in mid-flight into something else (an electron and two neutrino corpuscles in case of the muon). Now if, because of BAB, we cannot keep the corpuscle idea, then we are compelled to conclude that beside the source and detector apparatuses there is, in between them, an extra entity that plays the active role of transforming the observed hit patterns, and does this according to the relative position of the apparatuses at our human scale. To further analyse this "in between entity", we have to find a name for it, and we have the right to name it because we have found experimental facts that reveal the existence of this entity. We have to take care in choosing the name. In particular the name must reflect the fact that we deal first with apparatuses, that apparatuses are axiomatic ideas. The best name that we have found so far is the "vacuum of apparatuses", the VA in short. ("In Between Apparatuses", or IBA, could be a good name too).
The Vacuum of Apparatuses, the VA
This name has the huge advantage of using two words that bear clear sense for us. In particular this is much better than attempting to name the in-between entity by "quantum vacuum", a name that uses the word "quantum" which has been so ill defined since 1925! We claim high and loud that having identified the in-between entity as an active one by using the concepts of apparatuses and hits, and having been able to name it with clear words is a huge conceptual step in the story of seeking the right ontology, the right objects, for microphysics. So to the question: is microphysics only a hitology? We can now answer no, it is not. Microphysics must be viewed, because of decay-like experiments, as the study of apparatuses and of the outsider VA. We see also that "decay" is a highly misleading word since relying on a particle idea. In the following text we are going to use "hit-transmutation" experiments instead.
The VA makes it possible to restore object orientation in microphysics. The VA is "something out there" that has properties of its own, and one of these properties is to transmute hit patterns. We also see that the VA is related to space defined through the relative position of apparatuses. Nevertheless, because of the hit pattern transmutation phenomenon, this space cannot be reduced only to geometry. It is more than geometry, and we can already conclude, without any maths, that this phenomenon clearly rules out any theory, as the two relativities, that attempts to model space (space-time in fact) between apparatuses by pure geometry alone.
What is the maths for the VA?
In the HF, between the ψ of the hit-source and the operator for the detector, there is an extra entity called the Hamiltonian operator. By using the time-dependent Schrödinger equation, the Hamiltonian operator transforms (evolves) the ψ. By doing a spectral decomposition of the evolved-ψ against the local ψs of the detector attached to each outcome (cell), we can calculate the observed probability distribution of the firing events (the hits). The Hamiltonian is clearly describing something in between the hit-source and the detector apparatuses. Therefore it is natural to attach it, in our hitology interpretation, to our VA. So each of the essential components of the HF now receives its interpretation. We claim that these interpretations are based on better grounded ideas than the ideas found in QM (QM as defined above).
The maths for the VA of a hit-transmutation experiment
A simple Hamiltonian, such as the one describing the "harmonic oscillator" in QM, cannot model the transmutation of hit patterns. We need more sophisticated mathematics for that, and it appears that this maths already exists! It is nothing more than the maths of a "Quantum Field Theory" (QFT) and in particular the maths of QED for the microphysics of electric-charge-hit-sources. However, the QFTs suffer the same problems as QM at the level of the ideas that refrain a clear understanding of them. Mainly the QFTs still make heavy use of a particle vocabulary.
This vocabulary is visually reinforced by the intensive usage of the Feynman diagrams. A Feynman diagram is perhaps a nice trick for doing a perturbative calculation, but it is a huge intuitive and ontological trap from the very moment that the branches are attached to the idea of particle and that the word "particle" is suspicious. Moreover, the QFTs introduce new words such as "virtual", "quantum field" and the winner "quantum vacuum", that lead straight to the trap. The word "virtual" qualifies a particle attached to a branch of a Feynman diagram, but it is definitely not clear whether the "virtual particle" is something "out there" or not! If "quantum vacuum" is associated to "no particle", and that particle is suspicious, then quantum vacuum is suspicious too. The best that we can do here is to say that "quantum vacuum" is the name of the maths symbol |0 found in the maths of a QFT, that's all. No clear idea can be associated to these two words. The same for "quantum field"; here too the best solution is to say that it is the name of an operator in the maths of a QFT. About "quantum vacuum", if people attempt with these words to qualify the in-between apparatuses (as for the "in between" of the two plates of a Casimir setup), we claim that our VA terminology is superior since much better defined.
This being said, a strong point with QFTs, and especially QED, is that their maths is very impressive in giving the right probability distributions, and especially the ones of hit-transmutation experiments. So we are perhaps in a situation where we have found the right maths but not yet the right ideas for them. Now let us see if we can reread QFTs with our hitology ideas. If we look closely, the relationship of a QFT with experimental physics is established only through an input and an output "state". In general the word "state" is presented by using a particle terminology, for example an input or an output state with an electron and a positron in it with their own 4-momentum. In the formalism, it is modeled with symbols such as |e − e + . Now if BAB is right, we can no longer retain such an idea since the idea of a particle is no longer relevant. Instead, we have to rethink the symbols above as modeling some apparatus able to produce a hit pattern characterizing the association of an electron-hit-source and a positron-hit-source as defined previously through their definition-apparatus setup. Note that the hit-source apparatus could be something very complex. It could be a full accelerator setup! For example the LEP machine in the 1980s, or the LHC for the symbols |pp .
The final state, which is modeled with the same kind of symbols, has to be conceived as something attached to a hit pattern in a whole detector such as the ALEPH detector during the LEP era or the ATLAS detector at the LHC. In the formalism, to pass from an input state to an output state, there are a lot of in between operations and symbols that appear. What is the ontologic status of these in-between maths symbols? We are going to associate all of them as a model of the VA, which is something that exists for us and is very well defined as an object for us to work with (so unlike a "quantum vacuum").
Is there some specific set of symbols that maps the VA? In fact yes, we already have that. In a QFT everything is encrypted in the "Lagrangian". It is from this entity that inbetween manipulations are derived and that final probability distributions are calculated. So the Lagrangian can be seen as the piece of maths representing the VA. We must point out that for us the symbols for the VA is not |0 , since |0 does not bear any transmutational property.
This being said, we have now a better understanding of the meaning of the maths of a QFT and what QED is about. Moreover, the complexity of the maths attached to the VA reinforces the idea that this entity is far from being a "gentle space-time continuum" as described by the two relativities (Special and General), and various other space-time oriented theories.
In general we remain amazed at the complexity of the maths dealing with microphysics (and representing the VA for us). This algebraic inflation, originating from the introduction of the "i" of complex numbers by Schrödinger in his time-dependent equation, culminates in the SUSY maths where we end up manipulating extra dimensions made of Grassmann numbers. (Do SUSY defenders really believe that there are extra dimensions made of non-commuting numbers "out there"?)
What is high energy or particle physics?
We can now have a better understanding of the part of science called High Energy Physics (HEP) or. . . particle physics! Experimental HEP is nothing more than the construction of detectors and accelerators seen as hit-source apparatuses, the classification of hit patterns, the classification of natural hit-sources and the study of the hit pattern transmutations.
The theoretical aspect of HEP consists of finding the right QFT with the right Lagrangian that encodes all possible hit pattern transmutations found so far and makes possible the calculation of the right probability distributions of hits in detectors.
There is a lot to be done and someone can spend a whole research career in HEP science! 4.5 What is the "Standard Model", the "Higgs"?
The "Standard Model of particle physics" (!) can be defined now as the best Lagrangian discovered so far that encodes all known hit-sources and observed hit patterns.
An interesting point in the QFTs is that a "Lagrangian logic" of its own appears in them. If we take a Lagrangian, it may be deduced from another Lagrangian with less symbols, in particular by applying transformations justified by mathematical symmetry criteria. The Lagrangian of the Standard Model is such a "less symbols" Lagrangian. To model correctly all the "weak decay" hit patterns, the "reduction of symbols" procedure requires also the introduction of a "Higgs" term that can be related to a hit pattern of its own, but a hit pattern not yet seen in any experiment! For us, finding a "Higgs hit pattern" is the whole point of "seeking the Higgs" at the LHC. In particular "seeking the Higgs" cannot be "looking for a new little thing flying around". The "Higgs" is going to be a new hit pattern never seen before in any experiment, a pattern that will guarantee the mathematical consistency of the "best Lagrangian discovered so far", a Lagrangian that should be interpreted as describing a. . . vacuum of apparatuses! Does the Higgs term explain or solve everything at the conceptual level? In fact no, far from it. The Higgs term does not solve the integration of gravity in microphysics and it does not address, as BAB does, more fundamental issues concerning our understanding of microphysics.
Restoring OO in microphysics
We have seen that we can restore object orientation, and then good intuition, when dealing with microphyics. A first step is to get rid of the words corpuscle, particle and probably wave since nothing in our apparatuses measures or detects waves. Restoring OO could be done by the drastic rethinking, revisiting, of all the vocabulary used so far when dealing with microphysics. If some words are to be retained (such as electron, photon, atom,. . . ) they must be carefully defined, or redefined, by using a set of axiomatic words (apparatus, hit, vacuum of apparatus) that make sense for us. We claim in this text that this is possible by rereading the Hilbert Formalism as a hitology completed with the VA entity.
After having helped to recover intuitive comfort in microphyics, we are going to see that this hitological point of view can help in one of the outstanding problems in today's physics; the problem of the unification of meso-macro-physics with microphysics.
Gravity, General Relativity and the Grail of Unification
The maths of the QFTs is the best candidate we have for microphysics. This maths makes it possible to recover all hit probability distributions observed so far, and this, sometimes, with astoundingly accurate precision.
Nevertheless, gravity still eludes QFTs. Here we use "gravity" as a word originating in our every day experience in the meso scale and, as such, which does not pose a problem to our intuition. The best maths we have for this phenomenon observed at meso and macro scale, is the maths of General Relativity (GR in short). GR models this phenomenon as a curvature property of a Riemann continuum in which physical quantities are mapped on tensors. The main idea of GR is that gravity can be explained as an effect of space-time which is seen as an entity having a dynamics of its own. Awesome! With GR, space-time truly becomes an object with properties. GR is OO and space-time is one of its objects.
For meso and macro scales, GR theory is a brilliant example of "doing physics" as defined in the first paragraph. First, we have clear and elegant ideas; there are bodies (X µ (s) in the maths) and fields "out there" embedded in a space-time which is an object of its own. Second, we have good maths, such as tensors and Riemann geometry, with a nice mapping of ideas to maths symbols; in particular space-time is mapped to a metric tensor field. Third, we have a good match with experiments and observations in the mesomacro scale domains. Defenders of GR mention a match up to 10 −14 precision for the period of pulsar P SR 1913 + 16 [7] .
However, GR does not cover a good part of microphysics and in particular the hit pattern transmutations. GR is not a theory of microphysics. For example, it cannot explain the discrete spectrum of an illuminated hydrogen gas. For almost a century, physicists have been grappling with a difficult problem: we have a good set of maths for meso-macro scales and another set of good maths for microphysics but each has a logic of its own and we have not yet found some appealing common foundation maths to bring them under one common banner! Being able to do that is the challenge of the unification of GR and QM.
It is interesting to note that most unification attempts are done at the mathematical level where theoreticians attempt to bring under the same algebra the maths of the HF and the maths of GR. For us it is not so surprizing that these attempts at "unification by maths" failed so far. It seems that we forget that we deal with physics, and that a part of physics is ideas about what is "out there". We don't quite see how we can unify at the level of the maths if we have not unified at the level of the ideas! If the problem resisted for so long it is probably because we have not yet put the finger on the right set of ideas that would lead to a common underpinning maths for micro-meso-macro scales. Manipulating maths symbols having no mapping to an idea about something in nature is not doing physics.
As an example we can have a quick look at String Theory. What is String Theory? What is it about? Is it the science of one dimensional hits? Do string theoreticians expect to see one day or another spaghetti hits in a detector? Is String Theory only a mathematical trick to have more degrees of freedom for the maths between the input and output states by having, in any case, the goal of calculating the probability distributions of zero-dimensional hits? If the idea of zero dimensional objects is already ruled out by BAB, does it make sense to look for a microphysics based on objects of one, or even more, dimensions? What is sure is that if BAB is right, it would be highly surprizing that a String Theory for microphysics turned out to be right!
The right question: what are the apparatuses in GR?
Could HAT and the VA help in going farther on this problem of unification? We can easily answer "yes", simply by asking the question: what are the apparatuses in Special Relativity (SR) and GR? When reading Einstein, for example [8] , the response to this question is quite simple; the apparatuses in SR and GR are. . . sticks and clocks! SR and GR are based on the idea of a space-time continuum that assumes that, whatever the geometric scale, we can assign a coordinate quad (x, y, z, t) to all events and also to all space-time points. The assignment of coordinates done by one observer defines a coordinate frame. A frame is nothing more than the piece of maths representing a measurement apparatus in SR and GR. Moreover, these theories assume that we can assign two coordinate quads to one and the same event, in particular from two frames representing two "observers" in motion relative to each other. This kind of double assignment of quads to a same event is at the core of the encoding of relativism in SR and GR.
Having two quads, we pass from one to another with a "transformation". In SR, it is the Lorentz transformation (LT) that represents observers in a uniform movement relative to each other. In GR, it is a general r µ (x0, x1, x2, x3) transformation representing any kind of relative movement. By using tensors, the SR and GR formalisms make it possible to write an expression describing a physical law in such a way that the expression stays the same, has same form, after transformation. This constancy of form represents, in the maths, the idea of relativism that says that the laws of physics should look the same whatever we observe the "out there". This is great, but the absolute coordinate assignment is. . . a myth! We cannot build a detector covering all space-time for all scales, that is too idealistic. At micro scale, we cannot use a stick to do measurements within a presumed "atom" object.
Moreover, the idea of a double assignment of quads to a same event does not hold either at micro scale. Supposing we keep the idea that light is made of hypothetical photon objects, most of the time a measurement on one photon, for example done with a photomultiplier (PM), is said to destroy the photon. So, in such a theory "with photons", we may assign a quad to a photon in the frame defined by the PM, but we can no longer associate a quad to the same photon from another moving PM since the photon object. . . no longer exists! This loss of double assignment is much more striking with an apparatus-centered point of view. In this case an event is a hit which is, by definition, attached to a cell of a detector, so a hit cannot be attached to two detectors, whether they are in movement or not relative to each other. The loss of multiple quad assignments is natural here. HAT comes straight in with the right point of view and the consequences are drastic.
Since the "observation" (therefore a coordinate assignment) of a same "flash of light" (punctual event) from two different "observers" (frames) in movement relative to each other (for example, one observer in a train and the other on the platform) is the starting point of Einstein's reasoning that leads to SR and then GR, it must be concluded that if, at micro scale, we can no longer do this "observation" (quad assignment), then it is the whole SR and GR that collapse like houses of cards at this scale 4 .
The loss of double assignment destroys the way that relativism is encoded in "frame based theories". For example, there is no reason for the maths of micro scale to be "Lorentz covariant" anymore. If the LT makes no sense, the idea of "constancy of speed of light" at micro scale is highly questionable because the LT was introduced to encode this constancy in the formalism. Such questioning about light concurs with the BAB argumentation that tells us that the word "photon" cannot be associated with a corpuscle "out there": how can we speak about the speed of something if there is no. . . "something"!?
The word "light" should be associated (as should "gravity") to a meso scale phenomenon. At this scale, within the Maxwell theory, we can associate a speed to this phenomenon which is modeled with waves. With a meso-macro scale theory based on multiple quad assignments to a single "flash of light" punctual event and the axiomatic idea that the "speed of light" is constant for all coordinate frames, we can build SR and GR. At micro scale, the best that we can do is to associate to this "light" phenomenon the word "photon" defined by a pair of (hit-source, detector), but the connection of this pair to the word "light" of meso-macro scale is now far from being. . . luminous! One idea to achieve this association would be to define the word "lamp" as some kind of aggregation of photon-hit-sources. So a "lamp" would be a "source of light". The justification of such an aggregation brings us to the question of the constitution of apparatuses, a point which is going to be discussed later.
We also start to see how some unifying maths could operate; by keeping a frame logic for meso and macro scales (and so keeping SR and GR here), but by being able to evolve this maths to a logic not based on frames at micro scale.
At this point an important question arises: if we discard frames, and therefore SR and GR for micro scale, do we lose completely the idea of relativism at this scale?
Relativism with HAT and the VA
The idea of relativism is that physics laws should be expressed in the same manner whatever the way we observe nature. This sounds like a great idea and it would be a pity to lose it.
As seen above, in SR and GR this idea is mapped in the covariance of tensors that makes it possible to have a constancy in the form of formulas representing physical laws. The idea of relativism in SR and GR is then attached to a very peculiar way to "observe". The idea of "observation" is attached to the fact of being able to assign coordinate quads to everything (then define a "frame" identified with the "observer") and to the fact of being able to assign two quads to the same event. Looked at from this point of view, this is a very particular manner of expressing relativism which comes from a too idealistic way of "observing". Now if we can no longer keep the frame logic for microphysics, what happens to the idea of relativism? Is it possible to define it without frames? It appears that we can do so quite easily with an apparatus-centered point of view. In HAT, it is sufficient to state:
Whatever the apparatuses layout, the way to calculate the hit probability distributions must be the same. This is straightforward, simple. We call the above statement the Apparatuses Relativism Principle (ARP). How could it be represented in the maths? In fact it appears that the HF already does that! Yes, because whatever the apparatuses setup is, we attach a ψ to a hit-source apparatus and an operator to a detector-apparatus, and we have the same mathematical mechanism to get the probability distribution. We have to evolve the ψ, then decompose the evolved ψ to the operator local ψs attached to each possible detector outcome, and then take the square modulus of each term of the decomposition to get the probability distribution (Born's recipe). We already have a mathematical transcription of the idea of relativism in terms of apparatuses and hits for microphysics! Moreover, we see that this way of dealing with relativism is much more physical than that of SR and GR, because it deals with the idea of "observation" in a much more accurate and physical way than what is done with sticks and clocks in SR and GR.
In fact, we may even say that Quantum Mechanics, if understood as a hitology, is already much more relativistic than the two relativities themselves! (at this point Einstein definitely turns in his grave!)
It is interesting to note that in various unification attempts, theoreticians still keep the whole-coordinate-assignment idea and stay with the maths of tensors (extended with spinors) for microphysics. This may make sense from a maths point of view but it does not appear to be grounded from the point of view of microphysics. If we have to seek for new maths it should be for maths that keeps or restores the "multiple coordinate assignment of everything" for meso-macro scales, but goes to a HAT+VA+ARP+HF logic for micro scales.
A key experiment related to gravity in microphysics
To make progress on gravity at micro scale knowing that there are, because of BAB, huge questionings about the idea of objects at this scale, we have to do experiments that pose the right questions. Probably the best one that we can imagine would be a Bohm-Aspect setup with a gravity component, for example by introducing a "massive object" close to the "line of flight" (!) between the hit-source and one of the detectors. So an experimental setup with the three cases 1. no massive object on either arm. 2. one massive object close to one arm. 3. one massive object close to each arm.
If we label the three setups with σ=1,2,3, then we could get runs C exp (θ, σ = 1, 2, 3). What would the experimental curves be? Do we have a theory that could model this to give a C some theory (θ, σ) to compare with C exp (θ, σ)? Moreover, an ideal situation would be massive objects able to induce a gravity effect interpretable with GR, then interpretable as a space-time effect. For example, some. . . black holes would be nice! (Micro-macro experimental physics at last!). Here we would truly mix gravity with questions about microphysics. We would learn a lot about gravity in microphysics here! This kind of Bohm-Aspect-Einstein setup would be the most interesting since it would be related to the Bell reasoning. Something similar done with a variant of the two-slits or MachZender setups by putting, or not, massive objects close to their "lines of flight" would be very interesting too.
7 What are apparatuses made of ? The true fundamental question
QM textbooks?
With QM textbooks, we cannot answer this question because the word "particle" is not mapped to a direct maths symbol as a trajectory, and therefore we have nothing to recover a XY Z body (t) describing a body at our scale: we cannot build something from. . . nothing! In QM textbooks, this question is related to subjects as the "measurement problem", the "quantum to classical transistion" and the "decoherence". A lot is written about them, but we don't quite see how physicists can make progress without some reliable micro entity to build on! For example, for us "decoherence" is, first of all, a mathematical manipulation within the HF that shows that a "density matrix" (a version of ψ) can evolve to become diagonal. Fine, so what? If the density matrix is still not mapped to an ontological entity we have made no progress!
Bohm-model, Consistent Histories?
We may look for other interpretations that explicitly restore "particle" as an axiomatic idea, because with the idea of particle, and equipped with an aggregation mechanism, it is possible to recover bodies (a XY Z(t) in the maths). However, we have seen already that attempting to keep particles along with the HF leads in general to the introduction of additional weird ideas. In the Bohm model, in which there is a XY Z(t), the weirdness is due to action at a distance.
Another candidate model is the "Consistent Histories" (CH in short). At least in [10] and [11] , CH is presented with "particle" as an axiomatic idea. The compatibility with the HF is restored at the cost of axiomatic constraints in the method of calculating probabilities over possible "histories". In CH, the pruning of "branches" makes it possible to recover physical bodies and "us", as human beings 5 . This seems appealing, but looking closer it is still weird and the weirdness is related to these axiomatic constraints. From what we understand (?), there are objects that can have a property (position) in a first set of histories, but may not have this property (i.e. no position but momentum) in another set of histories said to be "not consistent" with the first set. The constraints allow avoiding the assignment of a join probability to sets that are not compatible (in particular not to assign a probability to "position and momentum"). So the constraints are related to the fact that "out there" there are objects for which we can no longer say if they have a property or not! If this is the case, then it is here that our intuition rebels because this is definitely. . . anti OO! In OO, an object has a property or it does not. If we look for an OO interpretation of the HF, CH is not the right horse to back.
HAT?
In HAT the situation is de facto clean. The question "what is a hit-source or detector apparatus made of?" is simply a bad question in HAT. It is a bad question because apparatuses belong to the axiomatic ideas and as such they cannot be built from more basic ideas. We may think that apparatuses can be built back from the VA, but this is not possible since the VA is deduced from apparatuses. So within HAT+VA the question is ill defined. We claim that being able to recognize this is progress compared to QM textbooks because QM textbooks cannot clearly state whether the question is ill defined or not within their axiomatic ideas. Logically a question can have an answer, but it may also be ill defined in such a way that no answer is possible, and being able to see that a question is ill defined is progress.
Nevertheless, we now come across another problem which is our HAT rereading of the "measurement problem" in QM. Agreed, by recovering understandable ideas at all stages in HAT, we now have a very consistent approach to deal with microphysics, but this situation is not satisfactory (which is not, for us, the same as uncomfortable) because all our intuition tells us that an apparatus is made of something. We can take a hammer and smash an apparatus to pieces. What is then the status of the pieces? At the very moment when they cease to be a detector, do they belong to the VA? Are they new hit-source apparatuses that "do nothing"? Despite the fact that a theory based on the axiomatic ideas of the quad (detector, hit, hit-source, VA) is highly consistent it is still frustrating because it is not intuitively satisfactory at the level of the status of the apparatuses. All our intuition tells us that the apparatuses cannot be axiomatic ideas. Which leads us to our rephrasing of the "measurement problem" in HAT that we state as
The "measurement problem" is the dissatisfaction that today's microphysics leads us toward a consistent model (HAT) in which apparatuses are axiomatic ideas, whilst our intuition tells us that they are not! We see that this problem can be rephrased in a more OO and therefore more comprensible way that allows us to ask the right questions. In particular, a straightforward one is: can we build more OO axiomatic ideas so that these new axiomatic objects can recover the (detector, hit, hit-source, vacuum-of -apparatuses) of our hitology?
"aparticles"?
Noticing that the BAB argumentation (if granted) rules out corpuscles only for the "in between" apparatuses, one way to build more OO axiomatic ideas would be to introduce some corpuscles or particles as an axiomatic idea but dedicated to build "apparatuses only". If we name this kind of corpuscle "aparticle" (for apparatus particle, or aggregatable particle), the axiomatic ideas would be: aparticle and the VA. Then the hit-source and detector apparatuses would be made by an aggregation of aparticles. We could perhaps even restore an (emitter, propagation, impact) logic by saying that inside a hit-source, an aparticle "does something" to the VA, that this VA modification is seen as a propagation at our scale up to the detector in which an aparticle reacts producing a hit, with the maths describing what happens between the emission and the impact being the HF.
Here's an idea; what if our brand new aparticle were nothing more that the. . . "good old atom"?! If so, this "atom" should be equipped with some special property so that it can be seen, from a HAT point of view, as an axiomatic idea to build back an apparatus.
Pairs of (emitter, receiver)?
Let us consider another idea. We have also seen that a "particle" could be defined by a couple (hit-source, detector) in HAT. A hit-source without a corresponding detector is nothing, and a detector without its hit-source is nothing either. So would it be possible to push the idea further and say that the "out there" is constituted by elementary pairs of (hit-source, detector) or (emitter, receiver) and that these are the fundamental building blocks of everything? Assuming that a gathering of micro pairs is possible, we would be able to recover a meso (hit-source, detector) pair, but would also recover the idea of being able to smash it into pieces.
To build a consistent model of elementary pairs, we would have to find some dynamics for these elementary pairs; at least some kind of crystalization dynamics to recover our scale (hit-source, detector) and some kind of "soup dynamics" to recover the VA from special states of micro pairs.
Relationship with software
OO is a terminology coming from software and it is not a coincidence if it is used here. We can have a close view of how data is treated if working a little on software for HEP experiments. This makes us aware that the primary input of "all that" is nothing more than a bunch of hits appearing in detectors if the right conditions are met, and in particular if we have, at last, built the right 27 km long accelerator! Software in HEP makes us realize that trajectories and particles are secondary entities that are "recovered back" in a step of data treatment called "reconstruction", a step which is targeted to build back the "final state", the one after the "interaction" (dangerous vocabulary). Here we see that particles and trajectories are clearly something introduced by us, humans, when treating data.
To treat data, we need to write software and to do that we need some programming language. For a long time HEP computer programs were done by using procedural languages such as FORTRAN, but the 1990s saw the migration to object oriented (OO) programming. This kind of language puts a gun in one's back and compels us to think hard to know "what are the classes", what could be considered as objects defined as standalone entities bearing their own properties. For the author, at a certain moment this questioning applied to HEP data treatment ran into the questioning about his longstanding discomfort with QM. This questioning leads to the conviction that one key ingredient to understand microphysics (the missing link!) is the recognition that our way of thinking is naturally strongly OO, that we are "OO thinkers". From here it is quite easy to reach the conclusion that perhaps the number one issue with the QM interpretation problem is that we have missed some key objects or key classes in the whole story.
Conclusions
Summary of the overall argumentation
After having defined what "doing physics" meant for us, we decided to examine the situation in microphysics. By granting the Bohm-Aspect experiment results and the Bell reasoning (BAB), we acknowledged that the concept of "corpuscle flying around" is hardly tenable for microphysics. We have seen that Quantum Mechanics (QM), defined as the Hilbert Formalism (HF) attached to a particle vocabulary is intuitively misleading. We have seen that reinterpreting the HF in terms of detector apparatuses, hits in detectors and hit-source apparatuses is a much more natural interpretation, especially if we have in mind how data is treated in experiments. We have named this interpretation the HAT interpretation. This is a more natural interpretation because it is object oriented (OO) and OO is a natural driving paradigm for us. By using the three OO concepts: detector apparatus, hit, hit-source apparatus, and a reinterpretation of "decay" experiments we have revealed the existence of the in-between apparatuses entity or vacuum of apparatuses (VA) entity, defining it in a very clear way for us humans. We reached the conclusion that the VA is an active entity having the capability to transmute hit patterns.
We granted that the maths of Quantum Field Theory (QFT) is the right one to describe the VA, but we rejected any particle vocabulary attached to a QFT. Because of hit pattern transmutation, we saw that the VA cannot be reduced to a space-time geometry, inducing that all theories, as General Relativity (GR), which are based only on a space-time geometry for the "in between" entity cannot be good for microphysics.
We saw that the problem of unification of Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity, if taken only at the level of the maths, is doomed, and that it has, first, to be solved at the level of the ideas. We saw that SR and GR are based on a too idealistic conception of a measuring apparatus. We saw that the reconsideration of the idea of apparatus at all scales could lead to the right underpinning maths able to recover the HF at micro scale and a Riemann geometry for meso and macro scales. Along the way, we stated an apparatus based relativism principle (the ARP).
We ended by rephrasing the problem of measurement in QM as the question "what is an apparatus made of?" and saw that it is an ill defined question in HAT. To overcome the frustration of not being able to "smash apparatuses", we mentioned two ways to build models with axiomatic ideas that can recover those of HAT, the first based on the aparticle idea and the second based on the idea of elementary pairs of micro (emitter, receiver).
Is nature OO?
So, to the question "Is nature OO?", we can answer that for meso and macro scales the answer is "yes". For microphysics, it looks like we have to yield some ground, but we believe that the answer is not yet "no"; a hitological point of view is a card still to be played. What is sure is that, if nature is truly not OO at this scale, "doing physics" will become a weird (maths, experiments) couple activity, with no clear meaning for us because no longer grounded on. . . reliable ideas! 9.3 Yes, we can! About the famous quote of R.Feynman [9] : I think I can safely say that nobody understands Quantum Mechanics we say: if Quantum Mechanics is understood as the Hilbert Formalism attached to a particle vocabulary then yes, we agree, we really don't see how someone can have a full understanding of Quantum Mechanics. Now to the question:
Can we understand microphysics?
we say: yes, we can! By using a hitology and a "vacuum of apparatuses" we can restore an Object Oriented point of view which, associated to the Hilbert Formalism, makes it possible to still understand this kind of physics.
No maths, only ideas
Some may note that there is no maths of our own in this text. This was done deliberately because of the deep conviction that the number one problem in today's physics is more around the ideas than around the inflationary maths. We hope that the chain of reasoning and ideas found in this text may help those who have intuitive discomfort with microphysics. What is sure is that the author, with his new HAT, sleeps much better now!
